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Abstract 
The distinction between similarity-based and rule-based strategies has instigated a 
large body of research in categorization and judgment. Within both domains, the task 
characteristics guiding strategy shifts are increasingly well documented. Across domains, past 
research has observed shifts from rule-based strategies in judgment to similarity-based 
strategies in categorization, but limited these comparisons to one prototypical environment, a 
linear task structure, and a restricted set of strategies. To systematically compare the two 
domains, we considered several instantiations of rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
and examined strategy choice across different types of judgment and categorization tasks. 
Between participants, we varied task characteristics from a one-dimensional linear to a multi-
dimensional linear and to two multi-dimensional nonlinear tasks. Irrespective of domain, 
strategies considered, or model comparison technique used, we find that more participants 
relied on similarity-based strategies when the functional relationship between the cues and the 
criterion was nonlinear. Shifts from rule-based strategies in judgment to similarity-based 
strategies in categorization, however, were rare and most pronounced in one-dimensional 
environments. These results support the hypothesis that the cognitive strategies people select 
to solve a judgment or categorization task depend less on the domain but more on the 
complexity of the task. 
Keywords: Judgment; categorization; cognitive processes; strategy selection 
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On many occasions in everyday life, the same task can demand a coarse classification 
or a more fine-grained judgment. When hiring a job candidate, for instance, the recruiter may 
sort the applicants into broad categories such as “qualified” or “unqualified”. Alternatively, 
the recruiter may judge the applicants’ qualifications on a more fine-grained rating scale from 
0 to 100 points; that is, from “not qualified at all” to “highly qualified”. Prototypical tasks 
used to investigate judgments and categorizations have indeed much in common (Juslin, 
Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). In addition, both research fields identified two main types of 
strategies people use to judge or classify objects (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson 
et al., 2003; McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 
2009): similarity-based strategies and rule-based strategies. These strategies make distinct 
assumptions about the way knowledge is represented and about the cognitive processes 
underlying judgments and categorizations (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003). 
Whereas similarity-based strategies base inferences on a comparison with concrete instances 
stored in memory, rule-based strategies rely on explicit abstraction of knowledge (Hahn & 
Chater, 1998). Given the similarity of the tasks, one might expect that making a coarse or a 
more fine-grained response does not affect the cognitive process. Yet the two research 
traditions have mostly described categorizations by similarity-based strategies, whereas 
judgment processes have been predominantly characterized as rule-based (Juslin, Olsson et al., 
2003; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). Confirming this characterization, past research 
suggests that people frequently shift from rule-based strategies in judgment to similarity-
based strategies in categorization (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; von 
Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 2013; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010). These 
strategy shifts are supposed to be driven by task feedback with binary feedback in 
categorization encouraging similarity-based strategies (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003).  
However, people do not exclusively rely on rule-based strategies in judgment and 
similarity-based strategies in categorization. Past research has sought to understand which 
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factors determine strategy choice within each domain by investigating a broad variety of task 
characteristics (e.g. Ashby & Maddox, 1992; Ashby, Waldron, Lee, & Berkman, 2001; Elwin, 
Juslin, Olsson, & Enkvist, 2007; Hoffmann et al., 2013; Juslin et al., 2008; McKinley & 
Nosofsky, 1996; Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008). Whereas categorization research puts more emphasis on how the number of 
cues that need to be integrated distinguishes between strategies (Ashby, Maddox, & Bohil, 
2002; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinely, 
1994; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006), judgment research identified the functional relationship 
between the cues and the criterion as a major determinant of strategy choice (Hoffmann et al., 
2013; Karlsson et al., 2007; Juslin et al., 2008; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006) and gave less 
consideration to the number of cues. These different foci make it difficult to compare research 
across domains, which may have concealed common factors underlying strategy choice in 
both judgment and categorization and thus overestimated differences in strategy choice 
between the domains. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the models used to describe 
similarity- and rule-based processes differ within and between domains. Judgment research 
typically contrasts linear rules with exemplar models, but the exemplar models considered 
differ in their complexity (cf. Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2014; Pachur & Olsson, 
2012; von Helversen et al., 2010). With categorization, in turn, the rules considered are often 
of a logical nature, constrained to one or two dimensions, and contrasted with exemplar or 
decision bound models (cf. Ashby et al., 2002; Donkin, Newell, Kalish, Dunn, & Nosofsky, 
2015; Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox, 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004). Basing strategy 
classifications on a limited set of strategies can, however, lead to misleading results even 
within a domain (Donkin et al., 2015). Donkin and colleagues found that the number of 
people classified to two strategy classes differed greatly as a function of the strategies and the 
data considered.  
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In the current work we aim to overcome these problems by systematically 
manipulating the number of dimensions and the functional relationship across judgment and 
categorization varying the task domain within participants and the task structure between 
participants. This systematic and integrative approach allows us to quantify to what extent 
specific task characteristics encourage strategy choice across domains. Furthermore, it enables 
us to estimate how far strategy choice is influenced by the task domain across different task 
structures and how far strategy choice is influenced by preferences for specific strategies 
across domains. Finally, taking the variety of models proposed in both domains into account 
we assess the degree to which strategy classification hinges upon specific assumptions about 
the cognitive processes by comparing the most representative instantiation or a variety of 
instantiations of rule-based and similarity-based strategies on different model selection 
criteria. In the following we will review first which rule-based and similarity-based models 
have been considered in the categorization and judgment literature and the task characteristics 
that have been identified to influence strategy choice. 
Rule-based Strategies in Categorization and Judgment 
Rule-based strategies are assumed to base inferences on abstracted knowledge (Juslin 
et al., 2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). A prototypical rule-based strategy in judgment, 
the linear model (Juslin, Jones et al. 2003; Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003), assumes that people 
abstract how each cue relates to the criterion; that is, people try to find out the importance of 
each cue. The judgment results from the sum of the cue values, weighted by their importance. 
A recruiter may, for instance, try to figure out which skills, such as programming skills or 
knowledge of a foreign language, are important for successfully fulfilling the job 
requirements and assign a high weight to language skills. Accordingly, the recruiter will rate 
job candidates as more qualified the better they speak the required foreign language. In a 
similar way, a person may follow the rule that all candidates who prove a certain level of 
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language skills can be classified as qualified. Hence, the probability of classifying the job 
candidate as qualified should increase with increasing language skills. 
Rule-based strategies proposed in the literature vary in their complexity from rules 
considering only one or two cues (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; 
Nosofsky, Little, & Denton, 2011; Nosofsky et al., 1994) to linear rules with several cues 
(Juslin et al., 2008; Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Newell, Weston, Tunney, & Shanks, 2009; 
Persson & Rieskamp, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013) or even complex nonlinear rules. Are 
there limits in the complexity rules can take? In judgment the dominant view is that people 
can and will learn linear additive rules, but have problems with more complex nonlinear rules. 
Nonlinear rules are assumed to be difficult because they cannot be learnt via a sequential 
learning process that considers only two subsequent objects (Juslin et al., 2008) and empirical 
evidence for nonlinear judgment rules is scarce (Brehmer, 1994).  
In categorization, it is assumed that people rely on logical rules based on explicit 
hypothesis testing processes when one or two dimensions need to be considered and are easy 
to describe verbally (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). When two or more 
dimensions need to be integrated, it is frequently assumed that people form linear or quadratic 
decision bounds between two categories via an implicit procedural learning process (Ashby, 
Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005), 
but that the knowledge summarized in decision bounds may not be verbalizable (Ashby & 
Maddox, 2005; Maddox, Bohil, & Ing, 2004). However, research in linear categorization 
tasks with multiple cues shows that people build up task knowledge and possess insight into 
the judgment process (Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006), suggesting that the 
boundary between explicit and procedural rule-based processes may be less clear cut.1 
Furthermore, the type of rule-based process may change over the learning process: 
Presumably verbal hypothesis testing processes may dominate in earlier stages, whereas 
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procedural learning processes take over in later stages (Ashby et al., 2001; Markant & 
Gureckis, 2014).  
Similarity-based Strategies in Categorization and Judgment 
Similarity-based strategies, in contrast, are assumed to base inferences on a 
comparison with concrete instances stored in memory. An exemplar model, a typical 
similarity-based strategy, assumes that similarity to past instances is used to make a 
categorization or judgment (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 
1988). These exemplar models assume that all previously encountered objects (the exemplars) 
are stored in long-term memory along with their associated categories (or criterion values in 
judgment). When categorizing a new object (the probe), past exemplars are retrieved from 
memory and the probe is compared to all exemplars stored in memory. The more similar the 
probe is to a past exemplar, the more likely the probe will be classified as belonging to the 
same category. For instance, when categorizing a new job applicant, recruiters may remind 
themselves of all employees who have held the job in the past. The more similar the job 
candidate’s language and programming skills are to language and programming skills 
possessed by qualified past employees, the more likely it is that this candidate is also 
classified as qualified. Similarly, when judging a new job candidate, the job recruiter may 
remind himself of all previous employees. The more similar the candidate’s skills are to skills 
of those employees who were judged as highly qualified, the more qualified the candidate will 
be judged. 
Similarity-based strategies vary in the assumptions regarding which information 
people retrieve and how this retrieval proceeds. Exemplar models varying only in sensitivity 
assume that people retrieve all exemplars to make a judgment or a categorization with the 
sensitivity determining whether people retrieve only highly similar exemplars or also more 
distant ones (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). Further, selective attention can modulate which cues 
people attend to. Exemplar models with attention weighting assume that people learn to 
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discriminate predictive cues from less predictive ones by focusing attention on the important 
cues and weighting them more heavily in the final judgment (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). 
More complex exemplar models in categorization finally allow for perceiving cues separately 
or integrally, for modeling of category biases, as well as for responding more 
deterministically or by probability matching (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000; Maddox & Ashby, 
1993). Judgment research, in contrast, has mostly focused on exemplar models modeling 
retrieval specificity (Hoffmann et al., 2013, 2014; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008) or 
attention processes (Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; von Helversen et al., 
2010, 2013). 
Factors Encouraging Shifts between Rule-based and Similarity-based Strategies 
Number of Cues 
The categorization literature has suggested that people approach a categorization task 
by testing simple rules that consider only one or two dimensions. If these rules are not 
successful, people switch to similarity-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; 
Nosofsky et al., 1994). For instance, Nosofsky et al. (1994) suggested that people test simple 
one- or two-dimensional rules when learning categorization tasks, but store exceptions in 
memory if the rules do not work. Similarly, Erickson and Kruschke (1998) suggested that 
people simultaneously process rules and exemplars, but restricted the rules tested to one 
dimension. Furthermore, people seem to process categorization tasks differently if they can be 
solved by a simple one- or two-dimensional rule compared to categorization tasks that require 
information integration (Ashby et al., 2002; Filoteo et al., 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; 
Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). In sum, this suggests that the number of cues is an important 
factor driving rule-based or similarity-based strategies in categorization. 
In judgment, meta-analyses identified the number of cues as one major factor 
determining performance (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Kaufmann & Athanasou, 2009). If more 
cues have to be considered for making a judgment, judgment performance decreases (Karelaia 
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& Hogarth, 2008). Kareleia and Hogarth (2008) explained this performance decrease by a 
decreasing match between the linear rules of the judge and the linear model of the 
environment. If the number of cues increases people may follow more complex strategies 
instead (Einhorn, 1971) or, alternatively, switch to similarity-based strategies. As a factor 
influencing strategy choice in judgment, however, the number of cues has — to our 
knowledge — been neglected. 
Functional Relationship between Cues and Criterion 
Past research has shown that strategy shifts in judgment are mainly influenced by the 
functional relationship between the cues and the criterion (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Juslin et al., 
2008; Karlsson et al., 2007; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Indeed, the majority of 
research suggests that people rely more on similarity-based strategies if the task cannot be 
solved by a linear rule, for instance, if the criterion is a multiplicative function of the cues 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013, 2014; Juslin et al., 2008). Quadratic task structures (environments) in 
which the criterion is a non-linear quadratic function of the cues may represent an exception 
because the same criterion value is associated with multiple, but dissimilar exemplars. Hence, 
neither similarity-based strategies nor rule-based linear models yield good performance early 
in training and people may drop back to the default, but useless rule-based strategy (Karlsson 
et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 2006). 
The functional relationship between cue and criterion has also been studied in function 
learning tasks in which people learn to predict a continuous criterion based on one continuous 
cue with varying functional relationships between cue and criterion. Overall, this research 
suggests that linear functions are learnt faster than exponential or quadratic functions 
(Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh, & McDaniel, 1997; DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997). In 
addition, rule-based function learning models fare well on extrapolation for linear functions 
(that is, at predicting response values outside the training range) but fail on extrapolation for 
exponential or quadratic functions (De Losh et al., 1997; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). 
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Associative, similarity-based models, in contrast, account successfully for extrapolation for 
exponential or quadratic functions if they incorporate a linear extrapolation mechanism (De 
Losh et al., 1997; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005), suggesting a combination of both processes.  
In categorization, nonlinear or quadratic category bounds are learned more slowly and 
less accurately than linear category bounds (Ashby & Gott, 1988), but people can reach near-
optimal performance when learning nonlinear bounds (Ashby & Maddox, 1992). How the 
functional relationship affects rule-based and similarity-based categorization strategies is, 
however, less clear: Linear environments are accurately described both by deterministic 
exemplar models and decision bound models (Maddox & Ashby, 1993), but decision bound 
models fit participants’ categorizations worse if the stimuli are integral; that is, perceived 
holistically, or the decision boundary is oblique and considers two dimensions (McKinley & 
Nosofsky, 1996). Further, in nonlinear environments decision bound models provide a better 
description of the data (Maddox & Ashby, 1993), but if the optimal decision bound is more 
complex than a quadratic bound, exemplar models seem to describe categorizations better 
(McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995). 
 In sum, judgment research provides some evidence for strategy shifts towards 
similarity-based processes with nonlinear functional relationships, but the evidence in 
function learning and categorization is less clear. In addition, the models tested against each 
other differ between domains as well as from models considered in studies that investigate the 
effect of the number of cues, leaving open the question of how much the results depend on 
specific assumptions underlying these models. 
Judgment versus Categorization: Feedback and Individual Preferences 
The task descriptions and the strategies in categorization and judgment resemble each 
other closely (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003). In both tasks, the objects are described by several 
cues that predict either a binary categorization or a continuous judgment. People learn to 
make these continuous judgments (or binary categorizations) over time by receiving 
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continuous (or binary) feedback about the correct outcome. Likewise, both domains assume 
that responses in these tasks are based on rule abstraction or similarity-based retrieval 
(Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2008; Juslin, Jones et al., 2003; Karlsson et al., 2007; 
Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). These similarities suggest that people rely on the same process 
within both domains. In this vein, it has been argued that people have stable individual 
preferences for relying on rules or similarity and exhibit those preferences across different 
domains, unless the task strongly favors one solution (McDaniel et al., 2013). Specifically, 
McDaniel et al. (2013) found that people identified as rule-learners in linear V-shaped 
function learning tasks transferred their preferences to a subsequent abstract categorization 
task. 
Past research has also found some striking differences between judgment and 
categorization. Several studies report that in linear tasks more people rely on a rule-based 
strategy in judgment, whereas in categorization the majority relies on similarity-based 
strategies (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Karlsson et al., 2008; von Helversen et al., 2010). One 
reason why different strategies may emerge across domains is the differential nature of 
feedback in judgment and categorization (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003). Task feedback allows 
the learner to adapt strategies to the task demands over time (Kämmer, Gaissmaier, & 
Czienskowski, 2013; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; but see Bröder et al., 2013). Feedback in 
judgment, however, is more fine-grained than the binary feedback in categorization so that it 
should facilitate inferring the cue-criterion relationship and ultimately promote the abstraction 
of rules independent of any other task characteristics (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003). In this vein, 
it has been found that if less effort needs to be invested in abstracting cue weights, for 
instance, when cue directions are known, more people rely on rule-based strategies (Newell et 
al., 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen et al., 2013). Likewise, learning which of 
two objects has a higher criterion value enhances reliance on rule-based strategies, possibly 
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because people focus on how differences in cue values are associated with differences in 
judgment criteria — an important step for rule abstraction (Pachur & Olsson, 2012). 
Past research has mostly restricted the comparison of judgment and categorization 
strategies to one prototypical environment, namely a linear task structure with multiple binary 
cues, and focused on a restricted set of strategies (but see Pachur & Olsson, 2012). However, 
the argument that people try to abstract explicit representations of the cue-criterion 
relationship when provided with informative feedback does not presuppose a linear 
relationship (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003), suggesting that more informative feedback may also 
enable people to develop explicit representations of cue-criterion relationships in more 
complex tasks. In sum, the degree to which people prefer the same strategy across domains or 
switch between strategies depending on the domain is still unclear. 
The Present Research: Strategy Choice in Judgment and Categorization Across 
Environments 
The current research examines how the domain affects strategy selection across a 
range of rule-based and similarity-based strategies and across different task structures. Our 
goal is threefold: First, we aim to assess the degree to which the number of cues and the 
functional relationship between cue and criterion — task characteristics that have been shown 
to strongly influence strategy selection in one domain but have been neglected in the other 
domain — affect strategy selection similarly in both domains. Second, we aim to investigate 
to what extent people rely more heavily on rule-based strategies in judgment than in 
categorization and to what extent a stronger focus on rules is influenced by the underlying 
task structure and personal preferences for strategies. Third, we aim to assess to what extent 
different methodological approaches, such as different model selection methods or the test of 
strategy classes versus single strategies, affect the research results. 
To this goal, we conducted two experiments. In both experiments participants solved 
both a categorization and a multiple-cue judgment task with the same underlying task 
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structure (i.e. environment). Both tasks consisted of a training phase, in which participants 
first learned to judge (or categorize) a range of objects, and a test phase, in which participants 
judged (or categorized) new objects. In Experiment 1 we varied the environment on three 
levels between participants, comparing a one-dimensional linear task (OLIN), a multi-
dimensional linear task (MLIN) and a multi-dimensional multiplicative task (MMULT), and 
task domain (judgment vs. categorization) within participants. Experiment 2 extended these 
results to a multi-dimensional quadratic task (MQUAD). Because the experimental method 
varied only slightly between Experiment 1 and 2, we present the results together for the sake 
of clarity. In a first step we test participants’ strategy choices using the most prominent 
representative from the class of similarity-based and rule-based strategies. In a second step, 
we investigate how stable those results are when considering a variety of instantiations of 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies and different model selection criteria. 
 
Method 
Participants. In Experiment 1, 96 participants (76 females, MAge = 23.7, SDAge = 5.9) 
were recruited from the University of Basel. Participants received course credit or a book 
voucher (worth 25 Swiss Francs, CHF). In addition, they could earn a bonus of 3 CHF in each 
task and had the opportunity to win one of six vouchers for an Internet-based retailer (worth 
25 CHF each). In Experiment 2, 32 participants (25 females, MAge = 26.5, SDAge = 10.7) were 
recruited from the same participant pool. Participants from Experiment 1 were not allowed to 
take part in Experiment 2. Participants received course credit or a participation fee (20 CHF 
per hour). As in Experiment 1, they could earn a bonus of 3 CHF in each task and had the 
opportunity to win one of two vouchers for an Internet-based retailer (worth 25 CHF each). 
Design and material. We used two different cover stories for the categorization and 
the multiple-cue judgment task. One cover story asked participants to judge the toxicity of a 
bug: In the multiple-cue judgment task, participants estimated how toxic a bug was on a scale 
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from 0 to 50, whereas in the categorization task participants classified the bug as toxic or 
harmless. The other cover story asked participants to judge how successful comic figures, the 
Sonics, were at catching small animals: In the multiple-cue judgment task, participants judged 
how many small animals the Sonic caught on a scale from 0 to 50, whereas in the 
categorization task they classified the Sonic as catching few or many animals. 
The stimuli for the two cover stories consisted of pictures of either bugs or Sonics. 
These bugs and Sonics varied on four different quantitative cues. The bugs varied on the 
length of their legs, their antennae and their wings, and the number of spots on their back. The 
Sonics had different sizes of their ears and their nose, and a different number of hairs and 
stripes on their shirt. These pictorial cues could be used to predict the criterion (the toxicity of 
a bug or the success of the Sonic). 
To manipulate the number of cues and the functional relationship, we varied how 
these cues had to be combined to form the judgment criterion. In the MLIN environment, the 
criterion cMLIN was a linear, additive function of the cues: 
cMLIN = 4 x1 + 3 x2 + 2 x3 + x4, (1) 
where c1 to c4 are the cue values ranging from 0 to 5. According to the cue weights, c1 reflects 
the most important cue and c4 the least important one.  
In the OLIN environment only one cue predicted the judgment criterion yOLIN: 
cOLIN = 10 x3. (2) 
In the MMULT environment, the function generating the criterion yMMULT included a 
multiplicative combination of the cues: !MMULT = #$%&'$(&)$*&$+&)$%$($*&$($*$+,.. 	. (3) 
Finally, in the MQUAD environment, the judgment criterion was a quadratic function 
of the cues: !MQUAD = 0.83 4 45 − 2.5 ) + 3 4) − 2.5 ) + 2 4' − 2.5 ) + 4# − 2.5 ) − 2.5 (4) 
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Subtracting 2.5 from each cue centered the cue values on their mean. Consequently, 
high and low cue values are associated with higher criterion values, whereas intermediate cue 
values are associated with lower criterion values. 
In the categorization tasks, the criterion was no longer continuous, but binary. This 
binary criterion was created by a median split on the corresponding judgment criterion for all 
possible items. Sonics (or bugs) with criterion values above the median were classified as 
catching many animals (or as toxic). Sonics (or bugs) with criterion values below the median 
were classified as catching few animals (or as harmless). This median split creates a linear 
category boundary in the OLIN and the MLIN environments, and a nonlinear category 
boundary in the MMULT environment. In the MQUAD environment, the category boundary 
was spherical; accordingly, the less similar an exemplar is to the prototypical exemplar with 
intermediate cue values, the more likely it is that the exemplar belongs to a different category 
than the prototype. 
For each participant, the cues x1 to x4 were randomly assigned to the pictorial cues 
(e.g., ears or nose). Higher cue values, however, were always associated with more salient 
pictorial features. For instance, a cue value of zero corresponded to a bug without spots on the 
back and a cue value of five to a bug with five spots on its back. Likewise, a cue value of zero 
on the cue “legs” corresponded to a bug without (visible) legs, whereas a bug with a cue value 
of five had long legs. 
From all possible items, we constructed two different item sets: a training set and a 
validation set. The training set was used in the training phase to allow participants to learn 
how to solve the tasks. The validation set was employed in the test phase to identify the 
judgment or categorization strategy that people followed. For constructing the item sets we 
first generated 1000 trainings sets, each consisting of 25 training items. Second, we selected 
one training set fulfilling two criteria: (a) For categorizations, one- or two-dimensional rules 
should not lead to a high accuracy in the multidimensional environments. (b) Linear rule-
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based strategies should solve the judgment and categorization task in the MMULT 
environment worse than similarity-based strategies; that is, a linear model fitted the training 
set worse than an exemplar model with a sensitivity parameter. Next, we generated 100 
validation sets consisting of 15 validation items and selected one validation set that strongly 
discriminated between the predictions of a linear rule-based model and an exemplar model 
with one sensitivity parameter for the judgment and categorization task in each environment. 
Table 1 depicts the final training set and Table 2 the validation set for Experiment 1. We used 
the same selection criteria as for the MMULT environment to create the training-validation 
set combination for Experiment 2 (see Table 3 and Table 4 for the specific items used). 
Procedure. In Experiment 1, we assigned 32 participants randomly to each of the 
three environments (OLIN, MLIN, or MMULT). In Experiment 2, all 32 participants solved a 
MQUAD environment. The assignment of the cover stories to the judgment and 
categorization task and the order of the two tasks were counterbalanced within each 
environment. 
During the training phase, participants learned to predict the criterion value (or the 
category) of 25 training items. In each trial, they first estimated the criterion or categorized 
the item. Afterwards they received feedback about their own answer, the correct outcome, and 
the points they earned. In a training block, all 25 training items were presented in random 
order. The training phase ended after 10 training blocks and participants moved on to the test 
phase. In this test phase, participants judged all 15 new validation items four times without 
receiving any feedback. 
Participants were incentivized to achieve a high task performance. In each trial of the 
categorization task, participants could earn 20 points for a correct answer, 10 points for items 
that were classified with a probability of .5 to both categories, and 0 points for an incorrect 
answer. In the judgment task, participants earned more points the less their judgment j 
deviated from the correct criterion y: 
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 (4) 
This function was truncated so that participants could win at most 20 points and could 
not lose any points in each trial. The more points participants earned in a task, the higher their 
chances of winning a retailer voucher for that task. In addition, participants could earn a 
bonus of 3 CHF in each task if they reached 80% of the points in the last training block. In the 
categorization task, this learning criterion corresponded to 80% correct classifications. In the 
judgment task, judgment accuracy was measured in root-mean-square deviations (RMSD) 
between participants’ judgments and the criterion. Participants reached the learning criterion 
if judgment accuracy was below 5.5 RMSD in the last training block. In Experiment 2, we 
relaxed the learning criterion for the judgment task to strongly encourage participants to learn 
the task: Participants could earn a bonus of 3 CHF if they reached more than 55% of the 
points in the last training block in the judgment task. The relaxed learning criterion in the 
judgment task corresponds approximately to a RMSD below 10 and accordingly participants 
reaching the learning criterion should still outperform a linear rule-based model and a 
guessing model by 2 RMSD (RMSDGuessing = 12, RMSDLinear = 11.8). 
 
Results: Single Strategy, Single Method 
 In the following we first report participants’ accuracies in categorization and judgment, 
separately for the two domains. Next, we describe the cognitive models used to describe 
participants’ judgment and categorization strategies and how task domain and environment 
impact on strategy selection. Finally, we analyze the influence of individual preferences on 
strategy selection across the different environments. Because accuracy in judgment and 
categorization as well as measures of model fits were not normally distributed we relied on 
non-parametric statistical tests. 
€ 
Points = 20 − ( j − y)
2
7.625
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Accuracy in the judgment task. Table 5 reports judgment accuracy in the last block 
of the training phase and in the test phase.  Judgment accuracy in training was measured as 
the RMSD between the criterion value and participants’ judgment in the last training block; to 
determine judgment accuracy in the test phase, we averaged participants’ judgments over the 
four presentations and calculated the RMSD between the criterion and the averaged 
judgments. At the end of training participants made more accurate judgments in the OLIN 
environment than in the MLIN environment (U = 200, p < .001) or in the MMULT 
environment (U = 222, p < .001), but judgment accuracy did not differ between the MLIN and 
the MMULT environments (U = 633, p = .106). The cover story (bugs or Sonics) did not 
affect judgment accuracy (U = 1132, p = .886), but participants solved the judgment task 
slightly better when the categorization task was solved first (RMSD = 4.6) than second 
(RMSD = 6.3, U = 1405.5, p = .063). Also at test, judgment accuracy was higher in the OLIN 
environment than in the MLIN environment (U = 131, p <.001) or in the MMULT 
environment (U = 159, p < .001), but did not differ between the MLIN and the MMULT 
environments (U = 571, p = .435). 
In the MQUAD environment in Experiment 2, participants made on average less 
accurate judgments than in the MLIN and MMULT environments from Experiment 1 in both 
training and test. However, 19 participants (59.4%) still outperformed a guessing model in the 
last training block. The order of the tasks did not affect judgment accuracy in the last training 
block, F(1,29) = 0.79, p = .382, but participants were slightly better at judging bugs (RMSD = 
10.8, SD = 2.4) than Sonics in the last training block (RMSD = 13.1, SD = 3.0), F(1,29) = 
5.74, p = .023. 
Accuracy in the categorization task. Overall, participants performed better in the 
OLIN environment than in the MLIN or the MMULT environments. Table 5 reports the mean 
percentage of errors in the last training block and the four test blocks. Participants made fewer 
errors in the OLIN environment than in the MLIN or MMULT environment in the last 
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training block as well as in the test phase. Like in the judgment task, participants made fewer 
errors at the end of training in the OLIN environment than in the MLIN environment (Mann-
Whitney U = 64.5, p < .001) and in the MMULT environment (U = 85.5, p < .001), but there 
was no difference in the error rates between the MLIN and the MMULT environments (U = 
499.5, p = .871). The order of the tasks (categorization or judgment task first) and the cover 
story (bugs or Sonics) did not affect how well people learned the task (U = 1101, p = .709, 
and U = 1032.5, p = .379, respectively). Similarly, participants made fewer errors during the 
test phase in the OLIN environment than in the MLIN environment (U = 47, p < .001) and in 
the MMULT environment (U = 60.5, p < .001). However, error rates did not differ between 
the MLIN and MMULT environments (U = 441.5, p = .347). Taken together, these 
performance results suggest that the number of cues affected how well people learned to solve 
the categorization and the judgment task but not the functional relationship. 
In Experiment 2, participants categorized the objects less accurately in the MQUAD 
environment than in the MLIN or MMULT environment from Experiment 1. Despite the 
lower accuracy in training, 25 participants (78.1%) still outperformed a guessing model 
predicting 44% of errors in the training phase. Categorization accuracy in the last training 
block was affected neither by order, F(1,29) = 2.15 p = .153, nor by the cover story, F(1,29) = 
0.14, p = .716. Similarly, participants made more errors in the test phase than in Experiment 1. 
Modeling of cognitive processes. To identify the cognitive strategies that people rely 
on in judgment and categorization, we first used a computational modeling approach that has 
often been employed to study judgment strategies (Hoffmann et al., 2013, 2014; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). This single-strategy approach contrasts one prominent 
representative of the class of rule-based strategies, the linear model (Lin), with one prominent 
representative of the class of similarity-based strategies, an Exemplar model with one 
sensitivity parameter but no parameters for the Attention given to each dimension (ExNoAtt, 
see Appendix A for more details on model specification, estimation, and selection). The linear 
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model, corresponding mathematically to a linear regression model, has often served as the 
prototypical rule-based strategy in judgment tasks (Cooksey, 1996). It can represent simple 
rule-based strategies relying on a single cue, but also allows more complex rules combining 
several cues in a linear additive fashion. However, it does not include nonlinear rules or 
interactions. The ExNoAtt model, a prototypical similarity-based model, compares the present 
object to all previously encountered exemplars. The more the cue values match each other, the 
smaller is the distance between the objects and, hence, the objects are more similar to each 
other (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Objects with higher similarity influence the final 
judgment (or category bias) more strongly. The ExNoAtt model allows the modeling of how 
specifically people retrieve the objects but it does not assume that people focus attention on 
specific cues. Finally, we included a random guessing model that assumes that participants’ 
responses vary randomly around a mean on each trial (Maddox et al., 2009). 
To select the model that best describes each participant, we used a generalization test 
(Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). We fitted each model to participants’ judgments (or 
categorizations) from the last three training blocks and predicted participants’ responses on 
validation items in the test phase. This generalization test corrects not only for model 
complexity in terms of the number of free parameters, but also for functional complexity 
(Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). We then determined relative model fit by calculating the 
deviances for each model based upon the difference between model predictions and 
participants’ responses. We weighted these deviances according to their success in predicting 
the responses. Deviance weights close to 1 for a model indicate that the model is more likely 
to have generated the data than the other models in the set, whereas deviance weights close to 
0 for a model indicate that the model is less likely to have generated the data. 
Model fits in judgment. The left upper panel in Figure 1 shows average deviance 
weights for the guessing, rule-based, and similarity-based model in the judgment task, 
separately for the four different environments (see Table 6 for descriptive statistics). 
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Descriptively, deviance weights for the rule-based model decline from the OLIN to the MLIN 
environment and are again slightly lower in the MMULT environment, whereas average 
weights for the similarity-based model increase. In the MQUAD environment, deviance 
weights are similar for the rule-based and similarity-based model, but slightly increase for the 
guessing model. The rule-based model outperformed the guessing model in all environments 
(all p < .001, r < -.63), but the similarity-based model could not be distinguished from 
guessing in the OLIN and the MQUAD environment (OLIN: p = .086, r = -.30; MLIN: p 
< .001, r = -.91; MMULT: p < .001, r = -.72; MQUAD: p = .060, r = -.33). Further, the rule-
based model predicted participants’ judgments better than the similarity-based model only in 
the OLIN environment (p < .001, r = -.94), but not in the MLIN (p = .052, r = -.34), MMULT 
(p = .963, r = -.01), or the MQUAD environment (p = .340, r = -.17). In sum, the relative 
model fit for the validation items in the test phase (i.e. the deviance weights) successfully 
identified the best model for the OLIN task; however, for all other tasks the relative model fit 
did not allow to uniquely identify the best model. 
Model fits in categorization. The left lower panel in Figure 1 shows average 
deviance weights for the guessing, rule-based, and similarity-based model in the 
categorization task, separately for the four different environments (see Table 7 for descriptive 
statistics). Descriptively, deviance weights for the rule-based model decline from the OLIN to 
the MLIN environment, but do not change in the MMULT environment. Similarly, average 
weights for the similarity-based model increase from the OLIN to the MLIN environment, but 
not more in the MMULT environment. In the MQUAD environment in Experiment 2, 
deviance weights are finally higher for the similarity-based model than for the rule-based or 
the guessing model. The rule-based model outperformed the guessing model in all 
environments in Experiment 1 (all p < .001, r < -.68), but not in the MQUAD environment in 
Experiment 2 (p = 1.00, r = .00). The similarity-based model made more accurate predictions 
than the guessing model in all environments (all p < .001, r < -.57). In the OLIN environment, 
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the rule-based model still outperformed the similarity-based model (p < .001, r = -.72), but 
model fits could not distinguish the models in the MLIN (p = .304, r = -.18) and the MMULT 
environment (p = .934, r = -.01). In the MQUAD environment from Experiment 2, the 
similarity-based model fared better than the rule-based model in predicting participants’ 
categorizations (p = .008, r = -.47). 
Predicting strategy choice. To further investigate how the task environment and the 
type of task changed strategy choice, we classified participants to the rule-based, the 
similarity-based and the guessing model. Overall, only a minority of participants was assigned 
to the guessing model in the categorization or the judgment task in Experiment 1 (see Table 6 
for strategy classifications in judgment and Table 7 for categorization), whereas a guessing 
model best described more participants in the MQUAD environment from Experiment 2. 
Descriptively, strategy classifications show a pattern similar to the average deviance weights 
within the task domains. Comparing classifications between domains across all environments 
shows that a few more participants were classified to the rule-based model in judgment (n = 
83) than in categorization (n = 71). Conversely, slightly more participants were assigned to 
the similarity-based model in categorization (n = 51) than in judgment (n = 40). 
Figure 2 (judgment task) and Figure 3 (categorization task) illustrate how well the 
predictions of the two models match participants’ responses as well as differences in the 
model predictions. The upper rows show predictions of the rule-based linear model (white 
crosses) for participants classified to the linear model (black diamonds) and the ExNoAtt 
model (gray circles) and the lower rows show predictions of the similarity-based ExNoAtt 
model. Overall, model predictions match the behavior of the participants classified to the 
respective model quite well and indicate where the models make different predictions. 
Particularly, the ExNoAtt model predicts a larger variability of responses in the OLIN and the 
MLIN environment than the linear model, whereas the linear model predicts in the MMULT 
environment an overestimation of low criterion values in judgment and an underestimation of 
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moderate criterion values in categorization. In the MQUAD environment the linear model 
predicts in both judgment and categorization that participants’ responses are independent 
from the optimal criterion value, whereas the ExNoAtt model predicts that participants can 
learn to a small extent to adapt their responses to the optimal criterion. 
To investigate how the number of cues and the functional relationship influenced 
judgment and categorization strategies, we collapsed the data from both experiments and 
conducted a mixed logistic regression analysis on the assigned strategy from the 
generalization test, excluding participants classified to the guessing model separately for each 
task. We included the task domain and the environment as fixed factors, setting for the 
environment one contrast comparing the linear environments against the nonlinear 
environments (OLIN and MLIN against MMULT and MQUAD), one comparing the number 
of cues in the linear environment (OLIN against MLIN), and one comparing the two 
nonlinear environments (MMULT against MQUAD). In addition, we included for participants 
a random intercept. To select the most important predictors for strategy selection, we 
compared models with different predictors using a likelihood ratio test and also report 
Akaike’s Information criterion (AIC). 
In comparison to a random model that only includes the random intercept for 
participants (AIC = 323) as a predictor, a model additionally using the environment as a 
predictor (AIC = 291) fared better, χ2 (3) = 37.7, p < .001, whereas using the task domain 
(AIC = 322) as a predictor did not significantly improve model fit, χ2 (1) = 2.8, p = .095. 
Likewise, accounting for the interaction between environment and task domain did not 
improve model fit, AIC = 289, χ2 (3) = 7.1, p = .069. The contrasts on the different 
environments suggest that more people are classified to similarity-based strategies in 
nonlinear than in linear environments, OR = 2.3, CI = [1.6; 3.4] with confidence intervals 
based on the likelihood-ratio method. In linear environments, more cues also increase the 
number of participants classified as relying on similarity-based strategies OR = 2.8, CI = [1.7; 
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5.3], but classifications in the nonlinear environments MMULT and MQUAD do not differ 
from each other, OR = 1.3, CI = [0.8; 2.0]. Overall, these results suggest that categorization 
tasks do not increase reliance on similarity-based strategies, whereas the number of cues and a 
nonlinear functional relationship increase reliance on similarity-based strategies. 
 Strategy preferences and adaptation. Investigating rule-based and similarity-based 
strategies across two domains allows us to investigate to what extent people’s strategy choices 
depend on an individual preference for one type of strategy (McDaniel et al., 2013) or result 
from an adaptation to the task demands (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Specifically, the individual 
preferences hypothesis suggests that if people relied on a similarity-based strategy in the first 
task, then the conditional probability of using a similarity-based strategy in the subsequent 
task should also be high. Likewise, if a person preferred a rule-based strategy in the first task, 
the conditional probability of using a rule-based strategy in the second task should also be 
high. The adaptation hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that the magnitude of this conditional 
probability depends on the environment: In tasks that can be solved by linear rules only the 
conditional probability for rules should be high, whereas in tasks that can better be solved by 
the exemplar model, only the conditional probability for an exemplar model should be high. 
To find out whether people possessed stable individual preferences across tasks or 
whether they adapted their strategy in response to feedback, we classified participants in a 
first step as following a linear model or an exemplar model in both tasks or as shifting 
between strategies in both tasks irrespective of the type of task (judgment or categorization). 
Descriptively, in the OLIN environment most participants (n = 26) relied upon a linear model 
in both tasks, but the number of participants following a linear model decreased to the MLIN 
(n = 14) to the MMULT (n = 9) to the MQUAD environment (n = 4). By contrast, the number 
of participants assigned to the exemplar model in both tasks increased from the OLIN (n = 0) 
to the MLIN (n = 6) to the MMULT (n = 8) to the MQUAD environment (n = 9). Likewise, 
the number of participants shifting between the guessing, linear, and exemplar model also 
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increased across environments (OLIN: n = 6; MLIN: n = 12; MMULT; n = 15; MQUAD: n = 
19). 
The left graph in Figure 4 depicts the conditional probability of following a rule-based 
linear model (a similarity-based ExNoAtt model) in the second task given that participants 
were best described by a linear model (or a ExNoAtt model, respectively) in the first task. If 
half of the participants shifted from the linear model in the first task to a ExNoAtt or a 
guessing model in the second task, a probability of .5 would be expected. In the OLIN 
environment, participants were likely to stay with the linear model in the second task if they 
were best described by it in the first task, p(RuleSecond| RuleFirst). In addition, they were 
unlikely to follow the ExNoAtt model in the second task, even if they were best described by 
it in the first task, p(SimilaritySecond| SimilarityFirst). p(RuleSecond| RuleFirst) decreased from the 
MLIN environment to the MMULT environment and dropped below .5 in the MQUAD 
environment, suggesting that participants were unlikely to follow a rule-based strategy in the 
second task even if they used it in the first task. In contrast, p(SimilaritySecond| SimilarityFirst) 
increased from the OLIN to the MLIN environment, but did not vary between the MLIN and 
MMULT environment. In the MQUAD environment, p(SimilaritySecond| SimilarityFirst) was 
higher than .5, whereas p(RuleSecond| RuleFirst) was close to 0 indicating that participants 
tended to stay with the ExNoAtt model in the second task, but not with the linear model. 
Taken together, the conditional probabilities p(RuleSecond| RuleFirst) and p(SimilaritySecond| 
SimilarityFirst) change across environments and, more importantly, strongly differ from each 
other. These results disagree with the idea that people possess stable preferences for rule-
based or similarity-based strategies and provide more evidence for the idea that people adapt 
the cognitive strategy to the task demands. 
It is possible that people change strategies to better solve the task and hence a strategy 
switch should lead to more accurate judgments and categorizations. To test this idea, we 
investigated whether strategy shifts can be linked back to task performance. Specifically, we 
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tested whether participants who shifted strategies in the second task show a stronger learning 
effect than those who did not switch strategies. Because these strategy shifts are rare, we 
analyzed all environments together. To only consider relative performance improvements, we 
z-standardized judgment and categorization performance (measured in RMSD or 
categorization error, respectively) separately for each environment and task domain. We then 
tested whether strategy shifts improved performance comparing this model to a random model 
and a model considering that performance may improve from the first to the second task. 
Compared to a model with participant as a random effect (AIC = 724), a model including the 
effect of task order (AIC = 717) fares better, χ2(1) = 8.7, p = .003. Including strategy shifts 
further improves model fit, AIC = 715,  χ2(1) = 4.1, p = .04, but not adding the interaction 
between task order and strategy shifts, AIC = 715, χ2(1) = 1.8, p = .181. Overall, this analysis 
suggests that all participants show a learning effect from the first to the second task, b = -0.35, 
t(127) = -3.0, p = .004, but those who switched strategies between tasks had on average a 
lower performance than those who did not switch, b = 0.26, t(126) = 2.0, p = .046. 
 
Summary and Discussion: Single Strategy, Single Method 
Experiment 1 and 2 studied strategy selection varying the task structure as well as the 
task domain. Across judgment and categorization, we found that more participants relied on 
linear rules in linear than in nonlinear tasks, whereas more participants were better described 
by an exemplar model in nonlinear tasks. When more dimensions had to be integrated linearly, 
the number of participants best described by rule abstraction decreased. Further, our results on 
strategy choice do not strongly support the idea that the effectiveness of feedback depends on 
the environment. Although, across all environments, a few participants were better described 
by a similarity-based exemplar model in categorization than in judgment, we did not find a 
major strategy shift between judgment and categorization. Lastly, investigating how 
consistently people chose rule-based or similarity-based strategies across the two domains 
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suggested that the conditional probability for choosing one strategy in the second task, given 
that participants chose the strategy in the first task, varied strongly between rule-based and 
similarity-based strategies and changed depending on the environment. Switching strategies 
between tasks, however, did not improve performance relative to those participants who did 
not switch. In combination, these results suggest that people do not stick with their preferred 
strategy across domains if it is maladaptive, but switching to another strategy does not help to 
catch up with those participants who continued using the same strategy. 
In the analysis reported above, we focused only on two strategies from each strategy 
class, rule-based and similarity-based, that have been repeatedly contrasted in judgment 
research (Hoffmann et al., 2013, 2014; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008): a linear, additive 
model and an exemplar model with one sensitivity parameter. These strategies we considered 
make rather strict assumptions about the rules people form or how people distribute attention. 
In our analyses, for instance, the exemplar model was restricted to pay equal attention to all 
dimensions. Exemplar models applied to categorization data, however, typically use varying 
attention weights to reflect the idea that important dimensions attract attention, whereas less 
important dimensions are less attended to (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Similarly, rule-based 
strategies may take more complex forms than a linear, additive rule. For instance, decision 
bound models in categorization assume that people can also form quadratic bounds between 
two categories (Maddox & Ashby, 1993). In this vein, Donkin et al. (2015) presented results 
suggesting that considering only a subset of models may change the number of participants 
classified to one strategy class. Taken together, it is possible that the lack of significant 
differences between judgment and categorization resulted from neglecting more complex 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies. 
In addition, strategy classifications may depend not only on the strategies considered, 
but also on the data and the model comparison techniques used (Donkin et al., 2015). In the 
analysis reported above, we relied on the generalization test to classify participants. The 
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generalization test not only punishes overly complex models for the number of parameters, 
but also accounts for functional complexity (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). However, estimating 
model parameters based on a reduced set of data may leave out parameter values that account 
for the full range of data, particularly when fitting more complex exemplar models. 
Accordingly, in the next section, we present to what extent our results vary when considering 
a larger variety of rule-based and similarity-based strategies as well as different model 
comparison methods. 
Comparison of strategy instantiations and model selection techniques 
 To estimate the impact that variations in the strategies considered and the model 
comparison technique have on strategy classification, we considered a range of instantiations 
of the rule-based and similarity-based strategy class with varying complexity. In the rule-
based strategy class, we allowed for more complex rules than linear ones by including 
nonlinear interactions between cues (Mult using two interaction terms and the reduced 
versions Mult1 and Mult2 using one interaction term each) or a quadratic relationship (Quad). 
In the similarity-based strategy class, we allowed exemplar models to include attention 
weights (ExAtt), to estimate additionally category or judgment biases (ExNoAttB and 
ExAttB), or to change the distance metric (ExDim). Subsuming a range of models in one 
strategy class, this strategy-class approach allows to determine the extent to which a 
participant can be best described by a rule-based strategy class or a similarity-based strategy 
class independent of the specific assumptions of one particular model. Further, we determined 
model fit and strategy classifications not only based on the generalization test, but also 
estimated the models’ parameters based on both the training and the validation set (i.e. fitting 
to training and test). For this method, we penalized each model for model complexity by 
using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) and calculated BIC weights 
BICwM for each strategy class in the strategy-class approach and the reduced set of strategies 
in the single-strategy approach. BICwM can take values between 0 and 1. BICwM close to 1 
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define a high posterior probability that the respective strategy class (or model) generated the 
data under the assumption that one of the considered classes is the data-generating model. In 
the following section, we determine whether varying the model selection technique and the 
set of strategy used may change the conclusions regarding the extent to which the task and the 
environment influence strategy classifications. 
Results: Method Comparison 
Predicting strategy choice. Figure 1 shows how average BIC and deviance weights 
for guessing, rule-based, and similarity-based strategies change depending on the model 
comparison technique (fitting to training and test or generalization) and strategies used (single 
strategy vs. strategy-class approach). As can be seen, most graphs show a similar pattern of 
results. BIC or deviance weights for guessing strategies are low in the OLIN, MLIN, and 
MMULT environment, but slightly increase in the MQUAD environment. Further, BIC and 
deviance weights in most graphs decrease for rule-based strategies from the OLIN to the 
MQUAD environment, whereas BIC and deviance weights for similarity-based strategies 
increase from the OLIN to the MQUAD environment. However, analyzing categorizations by 
fitting multiple strategies from the rule-based and similarity-based strategy class to training 
and test forms an exception: In the OLIN environment, this method shows higher evidence for 
similarity-based strategies than for rule-based strategies, whereas all other methods indicate 
more evidence for rule-based strategies. 
Similarly, strategy classifications indicate that more participants are classified to 
guessing when relying on the single-strategy approach (see Table 6 and 7 for classifications). 
Further, most classification approaches indicate that more participants are classified to rule-
based strategies in the OLIN and the MLIN environment than in the MMULT and MQUAD 
environment (with one exception in the OLIN categorization task). Lastly, slightly more 
participants are classified to similarity-based strategies in categorization than in judgment 
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(with the difference ranging from 8.6% using the generalization test in the single-strategy 
approach to 16.4% using fitting and a range of strategies). 
 To study the robustness of strategy classifications across different model comparison 
techniques and strategies used, we used a mixed logistic regression on strategy classifications 
from all four methods, but excluded participants best described by the guessing model 
separately for each task and method. Participants and method were included as random 
intercepts, whereas environment and task were included as fixed effects using the same 
contrasts for the environment as in the single-strategy analysis. Including random slopes did 
not change the results. Compared to a random model (AIC = 1199), a model that included the 
task domain, AIC = 1180, χ2 (1) = 21.7, p < .001, provided a better fit. Including the 
environment as a main effect further improved model fit, AIC = 1151, χ2 (3) = 34.2, p < .001, 
as did including the interaction between task domain and environment, AIC = 1113, χ2 (3) = 
43.9, p < .001. This final model showed a main effect of task domain suggesting that 
participants were less likely to rely on similarity-based strategies in judgment compared to 
categorization, OR = 0.31, CI = [0.19; 0.47] and a main effect of environment. Specifically, 
contrasts showed that more people were classified to rule-based strategies in linear 
environments than nonlinear environments, OR = 1.6, CI = [1.2; 2.2], but integrating more 
cues did not change strategy classification, OR = 0.92, CI = [0.61; 1.4]. In the nonlinear tasks, 
more participants were classified to similarity-based strategies in the MQUAD than in the 
MMULT environment, OR = 1.7, CI = [1.2; 2.6]. In addition, the model showed an 
interaction of task domain and environment. Breaking up the interaction by using contrasts 
indicated that differences in strategy choice between judgment and categorization were more 
pronounced in linear environments than in nonlinear environments, OR = 2.2; CI = [1.5; 3.8]. 
In the linear environments, more participants were classified to similarity-based strategies in 
categorization than in judgment in the OLIN task, but not in the MLIN task, OR = 6.2; CI = 
[3.1; 16.4]; in the nonlinear environments, the extent to which participants were classified to 
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rule- or similarity-based strategies in categorization and judgment did not vary between the 
MMULT or MQUAD environment, OR = 0.75; CI = [0.50; 1.1]. 
Strategy preferences and adaptation. Figure 4 shows the conditional probabilities 
for being assigned to a rule-based strategy class or strategy (or a similarity-based strategy 
class) in the second task given that participants were best described by a rule-based (or 
similarity-based) strategy class or strategy in the first task depending on model comparison 
technique (fitting to training and test or generalization) and strategies used (single-strategy 
approach vs. strategy-class approach). Overall, the different methods suggest a very similar 
pattern of findings with the main difference that fitting a variety of strategies to training and 
test suggests a lower probability of staying with rule-based strategies in the OLIN task than 
with the other methods used. Using the generalization test to discriminate between two 
strategy classes, on the other hand, suggests a higher probability of staying with similarity-
based strategies in the MLIN task. 
Discussion: Method Comparison 
 Applying different model comparison techniques or contrasting only a few candidate 
models may sometimes lead to different conclusions than considering a broader range of 
strategies or data (Donkin et al., 2015). Analyzing strategy choice across the different strategy 
classification methods, we found that accounting for method variance did not improve model 
fit — suggesting that overall strategy classifications did not vary strongly across different 
methods. Analyses with different model comparison techniques and sets of strategies 
replicated the result that in both judgment and categorization more participants are classified 
to rule-based strategies in linear than in nonlinear environments. Furthermore, considering all 
methods we found a small, but robust difference in classifications between the nonlinear tasks, 
with more participants classified to similarity-based strategies in the MQUAD environment 
than in the MMULT environment; the number of cues that need to be integrated, however, did 
not change strategy classifications across judgment and categorization. Furthermore, 
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compared to the single strategy, single method analysis, we found that more participants are 
better described by similarity-based strategies in categorization than in judgment — 
suggesting that the small advantage for similarity-based strategies in categorization is 
consistent across different methods. Finally, a closer analysis suggested an interaction of task 
domain and environment: more people were classified as following a similarity-based strategy 
in the OLIN environment in categorization than in the OLIN environment in judgment.  
Taken together, a statistical analysis did not suggest that strategy classification varied 
across different model selection methods and sets of strategies, although eyeballing strategy 
weights and classifications indicated that some methods showed conflicting results, 
particularly in the OLIN environment. One reason why different methods may yield slightly 
different results is that methods can differ in regard to how reliably people can be classified to 
a specific strategy and how well a specific strategy can be recovered given noisy data. To 
ensure that the modeling approach we used allows meaningful classification we conducted a) 
a reliability analysis determining how reliable the classifications based on each approach are 
and b) a large model recovery study determining how often each model could be recovered by 
the generating strategy class using the different approaches (details are reported in Appendix 
B). 
Overall, the reliability analysis suggested that strategy classifications show medium to 
high levels of reliability with single strategy classifications being slightly more reliable than 
strategy class classifications. The model recovery indicated that the majority of models could 
be recovered reasonably well in most environments and domains. One exception was the 
OLIN environment, in which exemplar models with attention weights could not be recovered 
in judgment. In categorization, the ability to recover a data-generating linear model or an 
exemplar model with attention weights depended on the model selection criterion and on the 
model generating the data. To ensure that problems to recover specific models did not 
influence our results in the OLIN environment, we designed a third experiment that allowed 
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us to better discriminate between rule-based and exemplar-based models in the OLIN 
environment (a detailed description is reported in Appendix C). Results from Experiment 3 
replicated the results from Experiment 1, suggesting that a few more participants are 
classified to similarity-based strategies in categorization as compared to judgment, but 
employing different classification methods may lead to different estimates of the size of the 
effect. Taken together, these results reinforce the conclusion that differences between 
judgment and categorization are most pronounced in the OLIN environment. 
General Discussion 
The distinction between similarity-based and rule-based strategies is core to many 
areas of cognitive science (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005; Sloman, 1996), but little 
research has linked similarity-based and rule-based strategies across different domains such as 
judgment and categorization. We have contributed to integrating judgment and categorization 
research by studying across a range of task characteristics and a range of instantiations of 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies whether the binary nature of feedback in 
categorization tasks more likely elicits similarity-based strategies than the continuous 
feedback people receive in judgment and how this depends on task characteristics, individual 
preferences, and the strategies considered.  
Past literature jointly investigating categorization and judgment strategies has often 
argued that task feedback contributes to strategy changes between judgment and 
categorization tasks (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; von Helversen et al., 
2010, 2013). We studied this hypothesis across a range of environments using two model 
comparison techniques and both a limited and a more exhaustive set of strategies. Across 
different methods, we found that less informative task feedback in categorization slightly 
increased shifts towards similarity-based strategies compared to continuous feedback in 
judgment. However, in relative terms only a small percentage of participants shifted from 
rule-based strategies in judgment to similarity-based strategies in categorizations. Further, 
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differences between domains were most pronounced in the one-dimensional linear task and 
less in a linear task with multiple cues or in nonlinear tasks. These results disagree with 
studies using binary cues reporting that more people rely on similarity-based strategies in 
categorization than judgment (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Mata et al., 2012; von Helversen et 
al., 2010, 2013). One reason why the differences in feedback may have had less impact on 
processing in our study is that the quantitative cues we used implicitly conveyed knowledge 
about the cue directions (Newell et al., 2009). Knowledge about cue directions has been 
identified as a strong predictor for strategy choice and hence may have led to more people 
relying on rule-based strategies in the categorization task (Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von 
Helversen et al., 2013). 
With respect to the question of how task characteristics affect strategy choice we 
found that in both judgment and categorization, the functional relationship between cues and 
criterion influenced strategy choice. Contrasting linear and nonlinear functions, we found that 
functions deviating from a linear form promoted similarity-based strategies and decreased the 
reliance on rule-based strategies. These results match past research suggesting that people 
frequently switch between strategies in both judgment (Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 
2008; Karlsson et al., 2007) and categorization (Juslin, Jones et al., 2003; Rouder & Ratcliff, 
2004) and resonate with studies showing the importance of the functional relationship in 
judgment (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007). Further, our 
results add to the debate on how the form of the decision bound influences decision bound 
and similarity-based models (Olsson et al., 2006; Maddox & Ashby, 1993; McKinley & 
Nosofsky, 1995, 1996): Considering a variety of rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
and different model selection methods, we found that a few more participants were classified 
to similarity-based strategies in quadratic than in multiplicative tasks suggesting that 
increasingly nonlinear decision bounds are better described by similarity-based strategies, in 
both judgment and categorization.  
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Although past research has identified the number of cues as an important factor 
driving processing differences between one-dimensional tasks and tasks requiring information 
integration (Ashby et al., 2002; Filoteo et al., 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Zeithamova & 
Maddox, 2006), we found that the number of cues only impacted strategy choice in both 
judgment and categorization when comparing two representatives from each strategy class. 
When extending our analysis to a larger variety of strategies and model comparison methods, 
the number of cues, however, had a negligible impact on strategy choice across judgment and 
categorization. Instead, feedback altered the extent to which participants were classified to 
rule-based or similarity-based strategies in the linear environments. In the one-dimensional 
linear environment, more participants were classified as following similarity-based strategies 
in categorization than in judgment, but this difference was less pronounced in the linear task 
with multiple cues. One reason why more participants were classified to similarity-based 
strategies in the one-dimensional linear environment is possibly that we considered a broader 
range of strategies than in previous research. Variations in the strategies considered may alter 
to what extent the similarity-based strategy class can identify all exemplar users (Donkin et al., 
2015). Accordingly, previous research may have underestimated the degree to which 
similarity may also influence categorization decisions in simple tasks. 
As one of the first studies, we directly investigated the extent to which people adopt 
similar strategies in the domains of judgment and categorization. Specifically, we contrasted 
the idea that individual preferences underlie strategy choice with the idea that strategy use 
results from a slow adaptation to the environment. Overall, our results did not support the idea 
that people may have constant preferences for one strategy across tasks: Conditional 
probabilities that people relied on a similarity-based strategy in the second task given that 
they relied on a similarity-based strategy in the first task did not match the corresponding 
conditional probabilities for rule-based strategies. Further, the magnitudes systematically 
changed as a function of the environment. However, those participants who switched 
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strategies between tasks did not benefit from these switches compared to participants who 
transferred knowledge from the first to the second task. Instead, participants who switched 
solved both tasks less accurately, suggesting that they may not have succeeded in building up 
a coherent task representation. 
In comparison to previous studies, we based strategy classifications upon different 
model comparison methods, fitting and generalization, considering both a range of strategies 
within a rule-based (or a similarity-based) strategy class as well as only two strategies per 
class. Although we obtained similar results applying those different approaches, the methods 
systematically differed in how well they recovered the models considered and in how 
consistently they classified participants to the same strategy class. Furthermore, the reliability 
analyses and model recovery study showed that the ability to recover a model depends also on 
the experimental task and its design. In particular, in simple tasks such as the OLIN 
environment data that can tease models apart may require a careful construction of the 
experiment in order not to bias the results of strategy classification to one of the models.  
On a theoretical level, our study matches well with the idea that people can rely on 
both similarity-based and rule-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson et 
al., 2003; Nosofsky et al., 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Although our study 
conceptualized the interaction of rules and similarity as shifts between cognitive strategies, it 
is also likely that people base judgment and categorizations simultaneously on rules and 
similarity by blending these two cognitive strategies (Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 
2010; von Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2014). Future computational accounts may 
further exploit how rules and similarity interact by disentangling shifting and blending 
processes. 
Taken together, our study suggests that people approach more complex tasks by 
relying more on similarity, with task complexity being a function of the functional 
relationship between the cues and the criterion and the number of the cues. However, whether 
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a task requires a categorization or a judgment and thus whether people receive binary or more 
fine-grained feedback influences strategy choice the most in simple linear tasks suggesting 
that the influence of feedback is overridden in more complex tasks. Strategy choice may be 
better understood as an adaptation process that is more challenging if the identification of 
task-appropriate strategies is more difficult. Studying how people deal with a range of 
cognitive problems may thus help to identify the conditions systematically triggering rule-
based or similarity-based strategies. 
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Footnotes 
1. Sometimes categorizations based on decision bounds are considered jointly with 
exemplar models as information integration models (Donkin et al., 2015), because the 
categorization likelihood depends on the distance of an item from the decision bound and is 
thus a question of similarity. Further, both exemplar and decision bound processes are often 
assumed to involve automatic processing (Ashby et al., 1998; Juslin et al., 2008). Here, we 
subsume decision bound models under rule-based processes for two reasons. First, 
categorizations based on decision bounds are made on the basis of abstracted knowledge even 
if that knowledge may not be consciously accessible, whereas exemplar-based categorizations 
rely on the comparison to exemplars from memory and thus a different cognitive process. 
Second, the level of explicit reasoning underlying the process is difficult to ascertain and in 
particular for linear rules evidence suggests that people have insight (Lagnado et al., 2006). 
2. In order not to overweight tiny differences in model predictions, predicted 
percentages in categorization could not fall below .001. Similarly, the fitted standard 
deviations had to exceed .001. 
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Appendix A: Cognitive modeling of rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
To identify the cognitive strategies that people rely on, we used a computational 
modeling approach. We compared how well the most prominent representative of the class of 
rule-based models, the linear model, described and predicted participants’ responses in 
comparison to one often-used model from the class of similarity-based strategies, an exemplar 
model with one sensitivity parameter. In a second step, we contrasted this single-strategy 
account with a strategy class account that compares a class of rule-based strategies (using 5 
different rule-based models) to the class of similarity-based strategies (using 5 different 
exemplar-based models). 
Guessing models. To account for random guessing in categorization, we included a 
random guessing model assuming that participants’ responses vary randomly around a mean 
on each trial (Maddox et al., 2009). For the judgment task, the guessing model estimated two 
free parameters: participants’ mean judgment and the fitted standard deviation (see the section 
on model estimation); for the categorization task, it estimated participants’ category bias (one 
free parameter). 
Rule-based models. To model rule-based strategies, we fitted five different models of 
varying complexity. The linear model, corresponding mathematically to a linear regression 
model, has often served as the prototypical rule-based strategy in judgment tasks. It can 
represent simple rule-based strategies relying on a single cue, but also allows more complex 
rules combining several cues in a linear additive fashion. However, the linear model (Lin, 5 
parameters) does not include nonlinear rules or interactions. Accordingly, the estimated 
criterion value  of an object p is the weighted sum of the cue values xpi, 
  (A1) 
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a constant intercept. Furthermore, we also 
fitted three models including nonlinear interactions between several cues. The optimal 
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multiplicative model (Mult, 7 parameters) to solve the multiplicative judgment task (Equation 




In addition, we also estimated two reduced multiplicative models (Mult1 and Mult2, 6 
parameters) that only estimated one interaction term, for instance w5, and sets the other one to 
zero, for instance w6. Finally, we also fitted a quadratic model (Quad, 5 parameters) that 
centers each of the cue values at their mean. This model corresponds to a decision rule 
assuming that objects with high or low cue values have higher criterion values. 
 (A3) 
For the categorization task we used these five rule-based models to determine the 
probability of classifying an object p with the estimated criterion value ĉ to category b, by 
using a logistic classification function defined as: 
. (A4) 
The smoother logistic function accounts for random error in the decision-making process 
(Juslin, Jones et al., 2003).  
Similarity-based models. To model similarity-based strategies, we fitted five different 
exemplar models. In exemplar models, the similarity S(p,j) between the probe p and exemplar 
j is an exponential decay function of the distances dpj between the objects (Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998). 
. (A5) 
Thus, smaller distances between the probe p and exemplar j indicate a higher similarity 
between theses objects. To determine this distance, the cue values xpi of probe p are compared 
to the cue values xji of exemplar j on all cues i. The more the cue values match each other, the 
smaller is the distance between the objects (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). 



















S p, j( ) = e−dpj
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. (A6) 
The sensitivity parameter h determines how strongly similarity decays with distance. Smaller 
sensitivity parameters indicate that similarity declines less with distance. The attention 
weights wi, summing to one, weigh how much attention each cue or dimension receives. 
Finally, the distance metric is determined by r, with r = 1 typically used for separable 
dimensions and r = 2 for integral dimensions (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). 
The probability of categorizing the probe p into response category b, , can 
then be determined by calculating the similarity of probe p to all exemplars in category b and 





The category bias β captures how much people have a bias toward one of the two categories. 
The simplest versions of the exemplar model only estimated the sensitivity parameter 
h (ExNoAtt, 1 parameter). The second model additionally assumed a category bias β 
(ExNoAttB, 2 parameters). Two more complex versions further estimated the attention 
weights, varying in whether they assumed a category bias (ExAttB, 5 parameters) or not 
(ExAtt, 4 parameters). Finally, the most complex model estimated the distance metric as well, 
but did not use a category bias (ExDim, 6 parameters). We did not include a response-scaling 
parameter because it can make exemplar models overly flexible (Olsson, Wennerholm, & 
Lyxzèn, 2004) and also does not find a corresponding mechanism in judgment. Accordingly, 
including an additional response-scaling parameter for exemplar models in categorization 
may bias model comparisons with exemplar models in judgment. 
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To account for judgments, Juslin, Olsson et al. (2003) assumed that the criterion value 
cj of an exemplar is stored together with its cue values in memory. To estimate the criterion 
value of a new probe , the criterion values cj for each exemplar are weighted by the 
similarities. Similar to the category bias in categorization, we also allowed participants’ 
judgments to be biased towards high or low judgments by including an intercept k. 
 (A8) 
We estimated five different versions of the exemplar model for the judgment tasks that 
closely mimicked the exemplar models for categorization. The simpler versions only 
estimated the sensitivity parameter (varying in whether they estimated the intercept, 
ExNoAttB, or not, ExNoAtt), the more complex versions further used attention weights (also 
using an intercept, ExAttB, or not, ExAtt). The most complex model also allowed the distance 
metric to vary without estimating an intercept (ExDim). 
Model estimation and comparison. To evaluate the models’ relative performance we 
used two model comparison techniques. In fitting to training and test, the models were fitted 
to both the last three training blocks and the four test blocks and evaluated based upon the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). Second, we compared model fits based 
upon a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000) that uses the fitted parameters from 
the training phase to predict participants’ responses in the test phase. 
All judgment models were fitted to participants’ responses by minimizing the deviance -




In the categorization task, the likelihood is defined as the models’ predicted probability of the 
chosen category. In the judgment task, we calculated the likelihood as the probability density 
€ 
ˆ c p
cˆp = k +









−2LL = −2⋅ ln L( )∑
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  51	
of participants’ judgments j assuming a truncated normal distribution, with the models’ 
predicted responses  as the mean of the normal distribution and an estimated standard 
deviation σ.1 
 (A10) 
To match the response scale from 0 to 50 we used this truncated normal distribution. 
To compare which of the non-nested models described participants’ responses better, 
we calculated the BIC for each model. This model selection criterion can be used to compare 
non-nested models. In addition, the BIC penalizes more complex models by accounting for 
the number of free model parameters k: 
BIC = -2LL + k ln(n), (A11) 
where n denotes the number of observations. Smaller BIC values indicate a better model fit. 
BICs were converted into BIC weights BICwM that give the posterior probability of each 
model given the data relative to the competing models (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004): 
 (A12) 
with ΔBICM as the difference between model M and the best model in the set and ΔBICi as the 
difference between a specific model i and the best model. For the strategy-class approach, 
BIC weights were summed for each set of rule-based and similarity-based strategies to yield 
the posterior probability of each strategy class (Donkin et al., 2015). For the single-strategy 
approach, we only included three models in the set (Guessing, Lin, and ExNoAtt) and derived 
BIC weights for each model based on the reduced set. 
The parameter values, estimated for the training phase, were also used to predict 
participants’ responses on the validation items of the test phase. To determine model fit, we 
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observed responses. This generalization test corrects not only for model complexity in terms 
of the number of free parameters, but also for functional complexity (Busemeyer & Wang, 
2000). We used the deviances further to calculate ⎯ in analogy to the BIC weights  ⎯  
deviance weights DwM for each model and each strategy class. 
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Appendix B: Reliability and model recovery for the different model selection 
criteria and strategy sets 
Reliability analyses. The reliability analyses investigated how consistently 
participants are classified to rule-based or similarity-based strategies by each method when 
using different sets of data (cf. Brennan & Prediger 1981). To this goal we estimated odd-
even reliabilities by splitting the test blocks into odd and even blocks. For fitting to training 
and test, the models were then fitted to the last three blocks of training and either the odd or 
the even test blocks. For the generalization test, the models were fit to the last three blocks of 
training and either predicted the odd or the even test blocks. We then calculated Cohen’s κ 
using the percentage of concordant classifications based on BIC or deviance weights and 
corrected for the number of categories (strategy classes) because the number of observations 
per category was not equal (Brennan & Prediger, 1981). 
Table B1 shows the odd-even reliabilities for the categorization task, separately for 
each environment, the model comparison technique (fitting to training and test vs. 
generalization test) and set of strategies used (strategy-class vs. single strategy); Table B2 
depicts odd-even reliability for the judgment task. Descriptively, strategy classifications in the 
judgment task (κ = .77, SD = .16) are slightly more reliable than strategy classifications in the 
categorization task (κ = .74, SD = .15). Moreover, odd-even reliabilities decrease from the 
OLIN (κ = .92, SD = .08) to the MLIN (κ = .72, SD = .09) and MMULT (κ = .72, SD = .13) 
to the MQUAD environment (κ = .64, SD = .16). With regard to the classification method 
used, fitting to training and test (κ = .82, SD = .14) yields more reliable results than 
generalization (κ = .69, SD = .15) and the single-strategy approach (κ = .78, SD = .14) a 
higher odd-even reliability than the strategy-class approach (κ = .72, SD = .16). Fitting to 
training and test by using the single-strategy approach yields the highest reliability (κ = .87, 
SD = .11). In sum, an analysis of odd-even reliabilities suggests to only consider one rule-
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based and one similarity-based strategy (as well as a guessing model) and to compare the 
models on their BIC values if model parameters are estimated using the training and test set. 
Model recovery. The model recovery investigated whether we can identify the data-
generating model using a specific set of strategies and different model comparison techniques 
(cf. Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). 
To determine how often each model could be recovered by the generating strategy 
class using the different approaches, we drew 100 parameter sets for each model based on the 
best-fitting parameters for each individual from fitting the models to training and test, 
separately for each environment and the judgment and categorization task. We then 
determined response probabilities or average judgments for each of the 25 training and 15 
validation items. Response probabilities were used to generate three simulated responses for 
each training item and four simulated responses for each validation item. Similarly, we used 
the average judgments to generate simulated judgments based on a truncated normal 
distribution with each model’s median standard deviation. 
To recover the models with fitting to training and test, we fitted all models (including 
a guessing model) to each simulated data set and calculated BIC weights for the single-
strategy and the strategy-class approach. For the generalization test, we fitted all models to 
each simulated training set and calculated deviance weights for the single-strategy and the 
strategy-class approach based on the simulated data for the test set. A data set was deemed 
successfully recovered by the strategy-class approach if the generating strategy class had a 
higher summed BIC or deviance weight than the other strategy class or the guessing model. 
Similarly, for the single-strategy approach a model was deemed successfully recovered if its 
representative from the generating strategy class had a higher BIC or deviance weight than the 
guessing model or the representative from the other strategy class. 
Figure B1 shows how often one model was successfully recovered by its strategy class 
in percent (black and white bars) as well as recovery by the single-strategy approach (gray 
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dots). The average percentage of models recovered per strategy class, environment, and 
approach used is presented in Table B1 for categorization and in Table B2 for judgment. 
Using the strategy-class approach, fitting to training and test (M = 85.0%, SE = 2.2%) on 
average recovered the models more successfully than the generalization test (M = 78.3%, SE 
= 2.3%). Using the single-strategy approach, fitting to training and test (M = 68.2%, SE = 
3.7%) only slightly outnumbers the generalization test (M = 65%, SE = 3.2%). Further, the 
strategy-class approach also recovered a higher percentage of models than the single-strategy 
approach. Figure B1 also illustrates that the different approaches show a high variability in 
how successfully they recover different strategies in different environments. In the majority of 
the tasks model recovery was acceptable, with the exception of the OLIN task. Using fitting 
to training and test for OLIN categorizations the strategy-class approach successfully recovers 
exemplar models with attention weights, but does not recover rule-based strategies. Using the 
strategy-class approach with generalization, in contrast, does not recover exemplar models 
with attention weights for OLIN categorizations, but can reproduce rule-based strategies. 
Further, no approach successfully recovers exemplar models with attention weights for OLIN 
judgments. 
In sum, we found that strategy classifications were most reliable when considering 
only a restricted set of strategies and fitting all strategies to training and test. However, this 
higher reliability comes at the cost of not detecting the specific data-generating model. The 
model recovery study showed that overall a strategy-class approach is more likely to recover 
the full set of models generating the data. In general, reliability and model recovery were 
reasonably high with exception of the OLIN environment, where in particular exemplar 
models with attention weights could not be recovered in the OLIN judgment task. This failure 
to recover some of the strategies might have biased the reported results for the OLIN 
environment. To rule out this conclusion, we designed a third experiment that allowed us to 
better discriminate between rule-based and exemplar-based models in the OLIN environment.  
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Table B1 
Reliability (Percentage of Agreement, Cohen’s κ) and Model Recovery in the Categorization Task in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Environment 
(Experiment 1) and in the MQUAD Environment (Experiment 2). Standard Error in Parentheses. 
 Strategy Class  Single Strategy 
 Reliability  Model Recovery  Reliability  Model Recovery 
Environment % κ  Rule Sim  % κ  Rule Sim 
 Fitting to Training and Test 
OLIN 100 1  50 (9) 94 (2)  97 .95  73 (18) 55 (18) 
MLIN 78 .67  80 (10) 96 (1)  78 .67  74 (18) 84 (5) 
MMULT 91 .86  87 (7) 98 (1)  94 .91  66 (17) 91 (4) 
MQUAD 72 .58  46 (4) 86 (3)  91 .86  25 (7) 82 (4) 
 Generalization Test 
OLIN 91 .86  82 (1) 47 (16)  91 .86  69 (17) 44 (17) 
MLIN 75 .63  74 (3) 81 (2)  78 .67  68 (10) 69 (6) 
MMULT 72 .58  79 (4) 80 (3)  72 .58  66 (12) 62 (8) 
MQUAD 66 .48  63 (2) 80 (2)  75 .63  47 (9) 73 (6) 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative 
environment; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic environment; Sim = Similarity 
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Table B2 
Reliability (Percentage of Agreement, Cohen’s κ) and Model Recovery in the Judgment Task in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Environment 
(Experiment 1) and in the MQUAD Environment (Experiment 2). Standard Error in Parentheses. 
 Strategy Class  Single Strategy 
 Reliability  Model Recovery  Reliability  Model Recovery 
Environment % κ  Rule Sim  % κ  Rule Sim 
 Fitting to Training and Test 
OLIN 88 .81  97 (1) 63 (13)  100 1  79 (18) 40 (21) 
MLIN 84 .77  96 (1) 94 (1)  94 .91  82 (15) 48 (16) 
MMULT 88 .81  99 (0) 94 (2)  84 .77  71 (13) 83 (5) 
MQUAD 72 .58  96 (2) 84 (3)  94 .91  74 (17) 66 (7) 
 Generalization Test 
OLIN 100 1  98 (0) 42 (19)  91 .86  83 (16) 36 (20) 
MLIN 84 .77  95 (1) 78 (6)  81 .72  84 (13) 50 (14) 
MMULT 72 .58  94 (2) 85 (2)  81 .72  75 (10) 73 (6) 
MQUAD 69 .53  96 (2) 78 (3)  69 .53  79 (15) 62 (8) 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative 
environment; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic environment; Sim = Similarity 
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Figure B1. Percentage of models recovered by their strategy class using two model 
comparison techniques, fitting to training and test (white bars) and the generalization test 
(black bars), separately for each task (columns), each environment (rows), and each 
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Appendix C: Discriminating between rule-based and exemplar-based strategies in one-
dimensional environments 
In Experiment 1, the model recovery suggested that exemplar models with attention weights 
are unlikely to be recovered in judgment and can only be recovered by fitting a broad range of 
strategies in categorization. To prevent more participants in categorization being classified to 
similarity-based strategies because of our inability to recover all similarity-based models in 
judgment, we conducted Experiment 3, which was designed to discriminate between rule-
based and exemplar-based models by relying on fitting to training and test. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two participants (22 females, MAge = 25.8, SDAge = 4.6) were 
recruited from the same participant pool at the University of Basel as in Experiment 1. 
Participants from Experiment 1 and 2 were not allowed to take part in Experiment 3. 
Participants received course credit or a participation fee (20 CHF per hour). In addition, they 
could earn a bonus of 3 CHF in each task and had the opportunity to win one of two Amazon 
vouchers (worth 25 CHF each).  
Design and material. We used the same cover stories and pictures as in Experiment 1. 
As in Experiment 1, the judgment criterion was a linear function of one cue, yOLIN = 10 * c3. 
To discriminate between the rule-based and the similarity-based strategy class, we selected 
the 25 training and 15 validation items so that the strategies made different predictions when 
fitting all strategies to training and test. We excluded items in the training set that required 
extrapolation to high cue values on c3 because exemplar models should not be able to 
extrapolate beyond the range of training items in judgment. Further, we excluded items with 
cue values close to the boundary on c3, because rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
should predict different responses on those items in categorization. Finally, to evaluate which 
method may discriminate best between the strategies, we conducted an a priori model 
recovery study using the same methodology as in Appendix B, but instead of using the fitted 
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parameters from each participant in the experiment, we used the median parameters from the 
OLIN environment in Experiment 1. Figure C1 shows the expected recovery rate for all 
strategies using different model selection criteria (fitting to training and test or generalization) 
for the strategy-class and the single-strategy approach. In the judgment task, fitting a range of 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies should allow good recovery of all strategies. For a 
few models, the expected percentage of recovered models is slightly lower in the 
categorization task, but fitting to training and test should still succeed in recovering most 
strategies. 
Results 
Accuracy in the judgment task. Judgment accuracy dropped from the last training 
block (M = 2.2, SD = 4.7) to accuracy in the test phase (M = 5.3, SD = 6.8). The order of the 
tasks did not influence judgment accuracy, F(1,29) = 0.00, p = .981, nor did the cover story, 
F(1,29) = 0.03, p = .871. 
Accuracy in the categorization task. Similar to the judgment task, participants made 
on average few errors at the end of training (M = 8.0%, SD = 16.4), but the percentage of 
errors increased from training to test (M = 17.0%, SD = 18.3). Performance in the last training 
block was affected neither by order, F(1,29) = 1.67, p = .206, nor the cover story, F(1,29) = 
0.60, p = .444. 
Model fits in judgment. Table C1 shows BIC weights, deviance weights and strategy 
classifications in the judgment task. BIC weights and deviance weights were close to zero for 
the guessing model and no participant was best described by guessing. BIC weights from the 
strategy-class approach suggested that rule-based strategies outperformed the guessing model 
(p < .001, r = -.92), as did similarity-based strategies (p < .001, r = -.76). Further, rule-based 
strategies provided higher BIC weights than similarity-based strategies (p < .001, r = -.65). 
Results based on different methods led to similar conclusions. 
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Model fits in categorization. Like in the judgment task, BIC and deviance weights 
for the guessing model were small and the guessing model only described a few participants 
best (see Table C1). Both the rule-based strategies (p < .001, r = -.87) and similarity-based 
strategies (p < .001, r = -.87) outperformed the guessing model when comparing strategy 
classes on the basis of BIC weights. The BIC weights, however, did not differentiate rule-
based from similarity-based strategies (p = .667, r = -.08). Using other model comparison 
methods, however, led to divergent results. The single-strategy approach suggested that rule-
based strategies outperformed similarity-based strategies (fitting to training and test: p < .001, 
r = -.83; generalization: p = .015, r = -.43). In contrast, comparisons of the strategy-classes on 
the basis of a generalization test suggested that people are better described by similarity-based 
strategies (p < .001, r = -.63). 
Predicting strategy choice. Descriptively, the majority of participants was classified 
to rule-based strategies in the judgment task, independent of the model comparison method or 
strategies used (see Table C1). In the categorization task, strategy classifications depended 
more strongly on the method used with a high number of participants classified to rule-based 
strategies using the single-strategy approach, but more participants classified to similarity-
based strategies using the strategy-class approaches. This difference presumably stems from 
including exemplar models with attention weights in the strategy-class approach. 
To analyze how the task, judgment vs. categorization, influenced strategy 
classifications, we again conducted a mixed logistic regression analysis on strategy 
classification in categorization and judgment, excluding participants classified to the guessing 
model. Participants and classification method were included as random intercept. Compared 
to a random model (AIC = 276), a model using task as a predictor performed better, AIC = 
236, χ2 (1) = 42.4, p < .001. Including a random slope for task further improved model fit, 
AIC = 233, χ2 (2) = 6.5, p = .038. This model still suggested an overall impact of the task on 
strategy use with less people relying on similarity-based strategies in judgment than in 
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categorization, OR = 0.12, CI = [0.02; 0.79], p = .006, but the number of participants 
classified more to similarity-based strategies in categorization varied with the classification 
method. 
Reliability. We calculated the odd-even reliabilities using the same approach as in 
Experiment 1 and 2. Table C2 lists the odd-even reliabilities separately for each task, model 
comparison technique, and set of strategies used. Across all methods, strategy classifications 
in judgment were more reliable (κ = .95, SD = .07) than in categorization (κ = .81, SD = .10). 
Further, generalization (κ = .92, SD = .10) yields slightly more reliable results than fitting to 
training and test (κ = .85, SD = .12) and the single-strategy approach a higher reliability (κ 
= .92, SD = .13) than using a broader range of strategies (κ = .85, SD = .08). In sum, the 
reliability analysis would suggest evaluating the strategy used based on a generalization test 
and a limited set of strategies. 
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Table C1 
Model Fits and Classifications During Training and Test in the Categorization and Judgment Task in Experiment 3. Standard Error in Parentheses. 
 
Strategy class 



























Fitting to training and test set 
 
Judgment .00 (.00) 0 
 
.78 (.07) 25 
 
.22 (.07) 7 
 
.00 (.00) 0 
 
.97 (.03) 31 
 
.03 (.03) 1 
 
Categorization .00 (.00) 0 
 
.50 (.07) 18 
 
.50 (.07) 14 
 
.00 (.00) 0 
 
.90 (.05) 29 
 





Judgment .00 (.00) 0  .94 (.04) 30 
 
.06 (.04) 2  .00 (.00) 0  .94 (.04) 30  .06 (.04) 2  
Categorization .02 (.02) 1  .18 (.06) 6 
 
.80 (.06) 25  .07 (.04) 2  .63 (.09) 20  .30 (.08) 10  
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; Mw = Model weight 
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Table C2 
Reliability (Percentage of Agreement, Cohen’s κ) in the Categorization and Judgment Task in the OLIN Environment (Experiment 3).  
 Strategy Class  Single Strategy  
Task % κ  % κ  
 Fitting to Training and Test 
Judgment 91 .86  100 1  
Categorization 88 .81  81 .72  
 Generalization Test 
Judgment 97 .95  100 1  
Categorization 84 .77  97 .95  
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; Sim = Similarity 
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Figure C1. Expected percentage of models recovered by their strategy class using fitting to 
training and test (white bars) or the generalization test (black bars), separately for each 
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Table 1 
Training Set for Study 1 Showing Cues, Judgment Criteria and Categorizations for the OLIN 
(derived from Equation 2), MLIN (Equation 1) and MMULT (Equation 3) Environment. 
Cues Judgment Categorization 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 OLIN MLIN MMULT OLIN MLIN MMULT 
2 1 0 3 0 14 2 0 0 0 
1 4 1 4 10 22 5 0 0 0 
0 3 1 2 10 13 2 0 0 0 
0 2 3 0 30 12 1 1 0 0 
5 5 4 0 40 43 29 1 1 1 
0 4 5 4 50 26 12 1 1 1 
2 4 3 0 30 26 9 1 1 1 
1 4 3 5 30 27 13 1 1 1 
1 0 2 4 20 12 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 0 6 1 0 0 0 
5 3 3 5 30 40 21 1 1 1 
1 1 5 5 50 22 7 1 0 1 
1 2 0 5 0 15 2 0 0 0 
5 5 0 1 0 36 4 0 1 0 
0 4 3 1 30 19 4 1 0 0 
4 2 1 3 10 27 6 0 1 1 
0 5 2 3 20 22 6 0 0 1 
5 5 2 4 20 43 22 0 1 1 
5 1 3 4 30 33 9 1 1 1 
4 0 2 4 20 24 3 0 0 0 
1 4 1 5 10 23 6 0 0 1 
3 0 5 5 50 27 3 1 1 0 
0 2 5 0 50 16 2 1 0 0 
1 5 2 4 20 27 10 0 1 1 
3 4 5 5 50 39 30 1 1 1 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear 
environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative environment 
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Table 2 
Validation Set for Study 1 Showing Cues, Judgment Criteria and Categorizations for the 
OLIN (derived from Equation 2), MLIN (Equation 1) and MMULT (Equation 3) Environment. 
Cues Judgment Categorization 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 OLIN MLIN MMULT OLIN MLIN MMULT 
3 5 1 4 10 33 10 0 1 1 
3 4 4 3 40 35 21 1 1 1 
5 0 3 4 30 30 4 1 1 0 
3 4 2 5 20 33 14 0 1 1 
5 0 5 5 50 35 4 1 1 0 
3 2 0 2 0 20 2 0 0 0 
2 3 4 0 40 25 9 1 .5 1 
4 5 4 5 40 44 36 1 1 1 
5 0 5 3 50 33 4 1 1 0 
4 3 0 1 0 26 3 0 1 0 
2 1 2 0 20 15 3 0 0 0 
2 5 2 3 20 30 12 0 1 1 
4 0 0 2 0 18 2 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 10 22 4 0 0 0 
3 3 3 5 30 32 15 1 1 1 
Notes: OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear 
environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative environment 
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Table 3 
Training Set for Experiment 2. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from 
Equation 4 for the Multidimensional Quadratic (MQUAD) Environment. 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Judgment Categorization 
0 3 1 4 25 2 
0 5 0 5 50 2 
0 5 3 2 35 2 
1 0 0 0 37 2 
1 1 2 4 13 1 
1 3 4 3 10 1 
1 5 2 5 27 2 
2 0 0 0 30 2 
2 1 4 5 13 1 
2 2 1 4 5 1 
2 3 0 2 10 1 
2 3 1 5 8 1 
2 3 5 2 10 1 
2 5 2 0 20 1 
2 5 3 0 20 1 
3 0 4 3 18 1 
3 1 2 0 10 1 
3 3 5 1 12 1 
3 5 3 5 20 1 
4 0 0 1 33 2 
4 3 0 4 18 1 
5 0 5 1 47 2 
5 2 1 2 23 2 
5 2 4 5 28 2 
5 4 5 4 37 2 	
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Table 4 
Validation Set for Experiment 2. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from 
Equation 4 for the Multidimensional Quadratic (MQUAD) Environment.	
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Judgment Categorization 
0 2 0 3 30 2 
0 4 2 0 30 2 
1 0 1 3 25 2 
1 2 2 2 7 1 
1 5 5 2 32 2 
2 3 1 3 3 1 
3 2 3 0 5 1 
3 2 4 1 5 1 
3 3 0 3 10 1 
3 3 1 4 5 1 
3 3 3 2 0 1 
3 4 4 3 8 1 
4 2 2 3 7 1 
5 2 4 1 25 2 
5 4 5 3 35 2 
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Table 5 
Performance in the Judgment and Categorization Task in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT 
Environment (Experiment 1) and in the MQUAD Environment (Experiment 2). Standard 
Deviations in Parenthesis. 
 Environment 
 OLIN MLIN MMULT MQUAD 
Categorization task     
% errors Training 3.8 (8.7) 22.5 (9.1) 23.4 (12.9) 29.3 (15.5) 
% errors Test 3.5 (8.3) 24.0 (11.1) 21.8 (13.1) 35.2 (18.4) 
Judgment task     
RMSD Training 4.2 (8.0) 6.7 (3.1) 5.4 (2.1) 11.9 (2.9) 
RMSD Test 3.4 (6.2) 5.8 (1.5) 5.5 (1.9) 14.2 (2.6) 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear 
environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative environment; MQUAD = 
Multidimensional, quadratic environment; RMSD = Root mean square deviation 
 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  71	
Table 6 
Model Weights and Strategy Classification in the Judgment Task in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Environment (Experiment 1) and in the MQUAD 
Environment (Experiment 2). Standard Error for Model Weights in Parentheses. 
 Strategy class  Single strategy 
 Guessing  Rules  Similarity  Guessing  Rules  Similarity  
Environment Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  
 Fitting to training and test set  
OLIN .05 (.04) 2  .89 (.05) 29  .05 (.02) 1  .06 (.04) 2  .94 (.04) 30  .01 (.01) 0  
MLIN .03 (.02) 1  .73 (.08) 23  .24 (.07) 8  .04 (.03) 1  .77 (.07) 25  .18 (.07) 6  
MMULT .00 (.00) 0  .61 (.08) 19  .39 (.08) 13  .00 (.00) 0  .61 (.08) 20  .39 (.08) 12  
MQUAD .00 (.00) 0  .47 (.08) 15  .53 (.08) 17  .22 (.06) 7  .38 (.08) 12  .41 (.09) 13  
 Generalization test  
OLIN .01 (.00) 0  .97 (.03) 31  .03 (.03) 1  .04 (.02) 1  .95 (.03) 31  .02 (.01) 0  
MLIN .01 (.01) 0  .55 (.08) 18  .44 (.08) 14  .03 (.02) 0  .64 (.08) 21  .33 (.08) 11  
MMULT .00 (.00) 0  .62 (.09) 20  .38 (.08) 12  .03 (.03) 1  .52 (.09) 16  .45 (.09) 15  
MQUAD .00 (.00) 0  .47 (.08) 16  .53 (.08) 16  .13 (.04) 3  .43 (.08) 15  .44 (.09) 14  
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative 
environment; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic environment; Mw = Model weight 
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Table 7 
Model Weights and Strategy Classification in the Categorization Task in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Environment (Experiment 1) and in the 
MQUAD Environment (Experiment 2). Standard Error in Parentheses. 
 Strategy class  Single strategy 
 Guessing  Rules  Similarity  Guessing  Rules  Similarity  
Environment Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  Mw n  
 Fitting to training and test set  
OLIN .00 (.00) 0  .28 (.06) 8  .72 (.06) 24  .00 (.00) 0  .72 (.08) 23  .28 (.08) 9  
MLIN .02 (.02) 1  .69 (.07) 22  .29 (.07) 9  .02 (.02) 1  .81 (.06) 26  .17 (.06) 5  
MMULT .00 (.00) 0  .63 (.08) 20  .37 (.08) 12  .00 (.00) 0  .64 (.08) 21  .36 (.08) 11  
MQUAD .12 (.04) 3  .45 (.08) 14  .43 (.07) 15  .18 (.05) 5  .17 (.06) 6  .65 (.08) 21  
 Generalization test   
OLIN .00 (.00) 0  .65 (.06) 25  .35 (.06) 7  .00 (.00) 0  .84 (.06) 27  .16 (.06) 5  
MLIN .04 (.03) 1  .56 (.08) 18  .40 (.08) 13  .05 (.03) 1  .54 (.08) 18  .41 (.08) 13  
MMULT .00 (.00) 0  .51 (.08) 15  .49 (.08) 17  .02 (.02) 1  .53 (.08) 17  .45 (.08) 14  
MQUAD .04 (.01) 0  .44 (.07) 13  .52 (.07) 19  .15 (.04) 4  .27 (.07) 9  .58 (.08) 19  
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear environment; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear environment; MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative 
environment; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic environment; Mw = Model weight 
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Figure 1. BIC and deviance weights for the guessing, rule-based, and similarity-based 
strategies (lines in each plot), for judgment and categorization (rows). Big graphs depict 
results from the single-strategy approach using a generalization test. Smaller graphs show 
how results change across model comparison technique and strategies used. Error bars depict 
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Figure 2. Model predictions from the linear model (white crosses, upper row) and ExNoAtt model (white crosses, lower row) averaged across those 
participants classified to the respective model, separately for the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT (Experiment 1) and the MQUAD (Experiment 2) 
judgment task. Black diamonds represent average responses from participants classified to the linear model; gray circles represent average responses 
from participants classified to the ExNoAtt model. Black lines depict perfectly accurate judgments. In the OLIN environment, no participant was 
classified to the ExNoAtt model and model predictions hence based on a fit to the criterion. 
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Figure 3. Model predictions from the linear model (white crosses, upper row) and the ExNoAtt model (white crosses, lower row) for those 
participants classified to the respective model, separately for the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT (Experiment 1) and the MQUAD (Experiment 2) 
categorization task.  Black diamonds represent responses probabilities from participants classified to the linear model, gray circles represent 
responses from participants classified to ExNoAtt model. Black lines depict median values that split the two categories. 
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Figure 4. Conditional probabilities of classifying participants to the rule-based strategy class 
(white bars) or the similarity-based strategy class (gray bars) in the second task given that the 
participant was classified to rule-based or similarity-based strategies in the first task, 
respectively. Conditional probabilities are depicted for the OLIN (one-dimensional, linear), 
the MLIN (multidimensional, linear), and the MMULT (multidimensional, multiplicative) 
environment from Experiment 1 as well as for the MQUAD (multidimensional, quadratic) 
environment from Experiment 2. Big graphs depict results from the single-strategy approach 
using a generalization test. Smaller graphs show how results change across model comparison 
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